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INTRODUCTION
Fairness opinions have become a regular feature of every major cor-
porate control transaction. Whether in negotiated mergers,1 freeze-out
mergers, 2 hostile tender offers, 3 friendly tender offers,4 self-tenders, 5
leveraged buyouts,6 negotiated share repurchases, 7 or negotiated sales of
treasury stock,8 directors seek the blessing of investment banks before
approving transactions or adopting defensive measures. These banks
give their blessings in the form of fairness opinions, which usually consist
of short letters that state an opinion about whether a proposed transac-
tion is "fair" or "adequate." 9 In addition, the banks often give presenta-
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1. See, e-g. Denison Mines Ltd. v. Fibreboard Corp., 388 F. Supp. 812, 821-22 (D. Del. 1974).
See generally Chazen, Fairness from a Financial Point of fVew in Acquisitions of Public Companies:
Is "7ird Party Sale Value" the Appropriate Standard?, 36 Bus. LAw. 1439, 1442-43 (1981) (fairness
opinions commonplace in merger transactions).
2. See, ag., Anderson v. Boothe, 103 F.R.D. 430, 433 (D. Minn. 1984); Gerstle v. Gamble-
Skogmo, Inc., 298 F. Supp. 66, 82 (E.D.N.Y. 1969), modifed 478 F.2d 1281 (2d Cir. 1973); Wein-
berger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 707-08 (Del. 1983).
3. See, eg., Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250, 257 (7th Cir. 1986) (poison
pill proposal), rev'd, 481 U.S. 69 (1987); Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d
264, 271 (2d Cir. 1986) (lock-up option); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 950
(Del. 1985) (rejected tender offer);, MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings v. Revlon, Inc., 501 A.2d 1239,
1243 (Del Ch. 1985) (purchase rights issue), aff'd, 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
4. See, eg., Danziger v. Kennecott Copper Corp., N.Y.L.J., Dec. 7, 1977, at 7, col. 1.
5. See, eg., Kahn v. United States Sugar Corp., No. 7313, slip op. at 3-5 (Del. Ch. Dec. 10,
1985) (Westlaw, 1985 WL 4449).
6. See, e , Herskowitz v. Nutri/System, Inc., 857 F.2d 179, 190 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied,
109 S. Ct. 1315 (1989); Beebe v. Pacific Realty Trust, 578 F. Supp. 1128, 1135 (D. Or. 1984).
7. See, eg., Kaplan v. Goldsamt, 380 A.2d 556, 561 (Del. Ch. 1977).
8. See, e-g., Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 365 (2d Cir. 1980).
9. See. eg. Crouse-Hinds Co. & Belden Corp., Joint Proxy Statement exhs. C-E (Oct. 14,
1980) (merger is "fair and equitable"; merger is "fair from a financial point of view"; tender offer is
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tions to boards of directors in which the banks justify and explain their
opinions. 10
One reason why corporate directors obtain fairness opinions is to
help persuade shareholders to approve transactions.II More importantly,
however, directors obtain fairness opinions in order to satisfy their fiduci-
ary obligations.12 Indeed, courts have indicated that they give weight to
fairness opinions in their analyses of fiduciary obligation. For example,
in Tanzer Economic Associates Profit Sharing Plan v. Universal Food Spe-
cialties, Inc., a New York court relied on a fairness opinion obtained by
the defendants, concluding that "[i]t is apparent that [the teims of the
freeze-out constitute] no palpable or gross undervaluation, which on its
face would shock the conscience of the Court."' 3 In Cottle v. Storer
Communication, Inc. the Eleventh Circuit noted that "[t]he fact that the
board consulted [an investment bank] simply weighs in favor of finding
that the directors did not abuse their discretion."'14 And in Smith v. Van
Gorkom, the court, in holding that the directors violated their duty of
care, emphasized the directors' failure to obtain a fairness opinion.' 5
This Article analyzes the problems with judicial reliance on fairness
opinions and considers the extent to which courts should give weight to
such opinions. One aim of the Article is constructive-to suggest a judi-
cial approach that may improve the reliability of fairness opinions; an-
"inadequate from a financial point of view"); Alleghany Corp. & Investors Diversified Servs. Inc.,
Joint Proxy Statement annexes III, IV (Mar. 29, 1979) (merger is "fair from a financial standpoint"
and "fair from a financial point of view," respectively); UOP Inc., Proxy Statement app. D (May 5,
1978) (merger is "fair and equitable").
10. See, eg., Lipton, TakeoverBids in the Target's Boardroom, 35 Bus. LAw. 101, 126 (1979)
(banker provides detailed analysis-and procedures used to develop fairness opinion), see also Gerstle
v. Gnamble-Skogmo, Inc., 298 F. Supp. 66, 83 (E.D.N.Y. 1969) (bank discloses financial data used in
fairness opinion), modified, 478 F.2d 1281 (2d Cir. 1973); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493
A.2d 946, 950 (Del. 1985) (same). But see Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc., 781
F.2d 264, 275-76 (2d Cir. 1986) (conclusory opinion; no documentary support provided).
11. See, eg., Denison Mines Ltd. v. Fibreboard Corp., 388 F. Supp. 812, 821 (D. Del. 1974)
(independence and reputation of investment banker adds persuasive support for management's
position).
12. See Chazen, supra note 1, at 1442; Fischel, The Business Judgment Rule and the Trans
Union Case 40 Bus. LAw. 1437, 1453 (1985); Note, Investment Bankers'Fairness Opinions in Cor-
porate Control Transactions, 96 YALE L.J. 119, 120-21 (1986).
13. 87 Misc. 2d 167, 178, 383 N.Y.S.2d 472, 481 (Sup. Ct. 1976).
14. 849 F.2d 570, 578 (1lth Cir. 1988).
15. 488 A.2d 858, 876-78 (Del. 1985); see also Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 384
(2d Cir. 1980) (fairness opinion evaluating merger proposal shows good faith); Kors v. Carey, 158
A.2d 136, 141 (Del. Ch. 1960) (use of outside experts factor in finding absence of misconduct);
Alpert v. 28 Williams St. Corp., 63 N.Y.2d 557, 572, 473 N.E.2d 19, 27, 483 N.Y.S.2d 667, 676
(1984) (dictum) (fairness opinion good proof that freeze-out price fair);, Danziger v. Kennecott Cop-
per Corp., N.Y.LJ., Dec. 7, 1977, at 7, col. 1 (obtaining independent financial advice before making
tender offer factor in holding that directors discharged fiduciary duties).
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other is critical-to show the limitations of possible improvements and,
accordingly, to warn against excessive reliance on fairness opinions.
The first two parts of this Article systematically analyze the
problems with fairness opinions. Part I shows that investment banks
possess significant discretion in issuing fairness opinions. One source of
this discretion lies in alternative definitions of "fair price." Another lies
in the alternative ways of measuring fair price, however defined. As a
result, investment banks have a choice among several widely disparate
estimates of fair price, all of which are justifiable.
Part H examines the conflicts of interest that investment banks face
in issuing fairness opinions. Conflicts of interest derive from the invest-
ment banks' fee structure, from their desire to retain and attract clients,
and possibly also from the bankers' psychological loyalty to managers.
These conflicts encourage investment banks to render the opinions most
conducive to the interests of the managers that hired them, and iot those
that best reflect the bankers' genuine beliefs. This part further argues
that neither reputational concerns nor internal procedures and guidelines
will significantly diminish this problem.
Part IH suggests a judicial approach to fairness opinions. This ap-
proach describes how courts should scrutinize the definition of fairness,
the measurement of fair price, and the banker-company relationship; the
approach also suggests that courts should exercise substantial residual
caution and limit their reliance on fairness opinions.
I. THE PROBLEM OF DISCRETION
In this part, we show that investment banks possess substantial dis-
cretion in determining what prices are "fair" to shareholders. Because of
this discretion, investment banks can arrive at widely differing estimates
of "fair price," all of which would be reasonable and none of which could
be shown to be "wrong" (or unfair) under objective criteria.1 6 That fi-
nancial analysts can regard widely differing figures as "fair" is problem-
atic for two reasons. First, the subjective nature of fairness opinions
reduces their value. Even if an investment bank rendered an opinion
based on its genuine beliefs about fair price, that would be just one bank's
opinion. Since other analysts could (legitimately) arrive at very different
opinions, no single opinion should receive excessive weight. 17
16. See, eg., Joseph v. Shell Oil Co., 482 A.2d 335, 339 (DeL Ch. 1984) (estimates ranging from
$53 to S85 per share);, Kahn v. United States Sugar Corp., No. 7313, slip op. at 18 (Del. Ch. Dec. 10,
1985) (Westlaw, 1985 WL 4449) (from $52 to $122); Kaplan v. Goldsamt, 380 A.2d 556, 566-67
(Del. Ch. 1977) (from S7.25 to $9.50).
17. A possible solution to this problem is to obtain more than one fairness opinion. See. eg.,
Brunswick Corp., Proxy Statement (Mar. 9, 1977) (charter amendment providing that certain trans-
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Second, and more importantly, this discretion enables investment
banks to act opportunistically. Investment bankers can formulate fair-
ness opinions serving their and the managers' interests, rather than ones
reflecting their best judgments of fair price. And, as the next part points
out, investment banks have strong incentives to write opinions that sat-
isfy the managers who hire them and negotiate their fees.
Investment banks' discretion in fashioning fairness opinions derives
from two main sources. First, as section A argues, the concept of fair
price is ill-defined. Second, as section B shows, even financial analysts
who use the same definition of fairness can differ in their assessments of
fair price, because of the subjective nature of the estimation process.
A. The Definitional Problem
Underlying the differences in analysts' fair-price estimates is a con-
ceptual confusion about the definition of fair price."' Courts have failed
to specify which definition of fair price investment banks should use,19
and investment banks generally do not disclose which definition of fair
price they have used;20 their fairness opinions simply state that prices are
"fair from a financial point of view" 21 or "inadequate." Different defi-
nitions can, however, lead to significantly different estimates.23 Since a
variety ofjustitlable definitions of fair price have been proposed, this defi-
nitional problem can be quite complex.
In addition, the suitability of any one definition depends on the kind
actions be found fair by two independent investment banks). Even multiple fairness opinions, how-
ever, might not provide much information, because of the potentially wide discrepancies in price
estimates. Furthermore, shareholders must bear the higher costs of multiple opinions.
18. Fair price is sometimes defined as the price at which a rational buyer with knowledge of the
relevant facts would sell the shares in an arm's-length transaction. See Nathan & Shapiro, Legal
Standard of Fairness of Merger Terms Under Delaware Law, 2 DEL 3. CORP. L. 44,48 (1977). This
definition, however, begs the question: different rational buyers might consider different definitions
of fair price appropriate.
19. See, e-g., Kahn v. United States Sugar Corp., No. 7313, slip op. at 29 (Del. Ch. Dec. 10,
1985) (Westlaw, 1985 WL 4449) (court declined opportunity to specify appropriate definition of fair
price); Joseph v. Shell Oil Co., 482 A.2d 335, 343-45 (Del. Ch. 1984) (same).
20. But cf. Kaplan, 380 A.2d at 563-64 (board compared fairness of price in negotiated share
repurchase to cost of shares in tender offer).
21. See, e-g., Crouse-Hinds Co. & Belden Corp., supra note 9, exh. D. Even practitioners do
not always know what "from a financial point of view" means. See Chazen, Friedman & Feuerstein,
Premiums and Liquidation Values" Their Effect on the Fairness of an Acquisition, in ELEVENTH
ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES REGULATION 143, 156 (A. Fleischer, M. Lipton & R. Steven-
son eds. 1980) (statement of Joseph Flom).
22. Cf I M. LIFrON & E. STEINBERGER, TAKEOVERS AND FRErazE-ouTs § 6.01[l[c][i]
(1988) (recommending that investment bank simply "opine as to the adequacy of the price offered").
23. See, e.g.. Joseph, 482 A.2d at 339 (different definitions resulted in estimates of $53, S80-85,
and 591 per share); Kaplan, 380 A.2d at 556-67 (different definitions resulted in estimates ranging
from S7.25 to 58.25 per share).
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of transaction at issue2 4 and the particular context of that transaction.25
Take, for example, a company facing an acquisition offer. The buyers
might seek to acquire the company through a merger, a friendly tender
offer, or a hostile tender offer. In this acquisition context, commentators
have suggested a variety of definitions of fair price. First, fair price could
refer to the value of the company as an independent entity-i.e., its value
if it does not engage in the proposed acquisition or any other.26 One may
seek to justify this definition of value as being most relevant to the choice
facing the shareholders: should they approve the merger, tender the
shares, and receive the value offered, or should they reject the merger
and (at least for the moment) remain an independent entity?
Second, some have suggested that fair price should be defined as the
value shareholders would receive if their company were auctioned off to
the highest bidder.27 While shareholders do not necessarily have this
choice, there is no reason in principle why a company should not be
auctioned off if that would enable shareholders to obtain a higher price.
Consequently, any price below the value that shareholders would receive
in an auction is arguably "unfair" to the shareholders.
A third definition of fair price might be the value that bilateral,
arm's-length bargaining would yield.28 This value is useful because it
24. See, eg. Chazen, supra note 1, at 1443-50 (proposing different fairness standards for non-
negotiated acquisitions by controlling shareholders, negotiated acquisitions by controlling sharehold-
ers, and acquisitions by unaffiliated purchasers). Making the definition of fair price dependent on the
type of transaction in question poses the danger that banks will manipulate definitions to favor
management. For example, an opinion that the terms of a merger are fair apparently means that the
price is within a range of fair prices, but not the highest price attainable. See Chazen, Friedman &
Feuerstein, supra note 21, at 147. But an opinion that the terms of a hostile takeover bid are inade-
quate merely signifies that, even though the terms are fair, better terms can be obtained. See Weiss,
The Law of Take Out Mergers: Weinberger v. UOP, Inc. Ushers in Phase Six, 4 CARDozo L. REv.
245, 256 (1983).
25. Cf Saffer, Touching All Bases in Setting Merger Pices, MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS, Fall
1984, at 42 (discussing which valuation method bidders should use in which context).
26. Sea e'g. Schwartz, The Fairness of Tender Offer Prices in Utilitarian Theory, 17 L LEGAL
STUD. 165, 165-67 (1988). Because Schwartz believes that a company's independent value is given
by the market price of its shares, he probably would see no need for fairness opinions written by
bankers. If a company's shares are not publicly traded or if the share price does not reflect the
company's value as an independent entity (eg., because of the existence of significant nonpublic
information), Schwartz would presumably advocate that a bank base its fairness opinion on the
company's value as an independent entity.
27. See, e, Bebchuk, The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Offer% 95 HARv. L. REv.
1028, 103841 (1982); Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive
Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REV. 819, 868-75 (1981) (arguing for auction strategy in
response to tender offer).
28. Cf Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306-07 (1939) (in self-dealing, test of fairness is whether
transaction has earmarks of arm's-length bargain). This definition of fair price also follows from the
"sole owner standard" put forward in Bebchuk, The Sole Owner Standard for Takeover Policy, 17 J.
LEGAL STUD. 197, 197-98 (1988).
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shows shareholders whether they might be better off not selling but
rather returning to the bargaining table or waiting for another bid.29
This value also shows whether managers adequately represented share-
holders in negotiating transaction terms and in structuring takeover de-
fenses. In particular, use of this definition can indicate whether or not a
conflict of interest affected managers during negotiation.30 Moreover, if
an acquisition creates unique gains that would not arise from acquisition
by another party, bargaining would arguably lead to a fair division of
these gains.
This list of definitions is not meant to be exhaustive; indeed, some
may advance several other definitions of fair price, such as the value of
the company's net assets31 or the value of the company as an independent
entity plus a fraction of any gains resulting from the acquisition. More-
over, one can combine these definitions to form new definitions: fair
price, for example, can be defined as the average of several definitions,
under the argument that each definition captures one aspect of value.32
The appropriateness of any definition also might depend on the con-
text of the acquisition in question. If several suitors showed interest in a
company, an auction price might arguably be more appropriate than the
independent value of the company; 33 if the acquisition would produce
29. Empirical evidence shows that many unsuccessful merger negotiations and tender offers are
followed by successful bids. Bradley, Desai & Kim, The Rationale Behind Interfirm Tender Offer,
11 J. FIN. ECON. 183, 188 (1983) (of 112 unsuccessful tender offer targets, 86 were acquired within 5
years). This suggests that shareholders can reasonably expect to realize a value above a company's
independent value even if they reject an acquisition proposal.
30. Courts and commentators generally agree that corporate control transactions involve the
potential for confficts of interest. See R. CLARK, Co.OiATE LAW §§ 4.1, 12.2.5, 13.2.1 (1986).
31. See, eg., E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Collins, 432 U.S. 46, 54-56 (1977) (net asset
value is fair price); Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 298 F. Supp. 66, 100 (E.D.N.Y. 1969) (same),
modified, 478 F.2d 1281 (2d Cir. 1973).
32. If measurement of fair price according to each definition will result in an unbiased but
inaccurate estimate of the true fair price, an appropriately weighted average will result in a more
accurate estimate. See generally T. WONNACOTr & IL WONNACOTT, INTRODUCTORY STATISTICS
FOR BUSINESS AND ECONOMICS 129-31, 179-85 (2d ed. 1977) (Unless multiple estimators are per-
fectly correlated, the variance of their sum is less than the sum of their variances; therefore, some
weighted averages of several unbiased estimators will be a more accurate estimator than any one
estimator alone.).
Courts generally use a weighted average of different measures of value in the context of ap-
praisal rights. See, ,,g., Piemonte v. New Boston Garden Corp., 377 Mass. 719, 733, 387 N.E.2d
1145, 1153 (1979) (upholding weighted average of market value, earnings value, and net asset value);
Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Bade, 37 N.Y.2d 585, 587, 338 N.E.2d 614, 616, 376 N.Y.S.2d 103, 106
(1975) (to determine fair value, court should consider net asset value, investment value, and market
value). But cf Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 712 (Del. 1983) (overruling precedents that
used weighted average to exclusion of other accepted valuation techniques).
33. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986)
(when company's sale to one of several bidders becomes inevitable, directors obliged to conduct
neutral auction).
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unique gains, the negotiation price might arguably be more appropriate
than the auction price. Another factor that investment banks apparently
consider relevant is whether a bank renders a fairness opinion in a
friendly or a hostile deal. In the former, the opinion indicates whether a
reasonably prudent board could accept the offered terms;34 in the latter,
it states whether the bank believes that a better offer can be obtained.
3 5
Turning from acquisitions to other transactions, it seems that every
type of transaction might require a different definition of fair price. Take
freeze-out mergers as an example. In these mergers, fair price might fo-
cus on the company's value as an independent entity,36 as the market
price of the minority shares, 37 or as the price the minority shares would
receive if auctioned off as a block. 38 In addition, one might add to any of
these measures a fraction of any freeze-out gains39 that might arise, or an
appropriation for the tax expenses and reinvestment transaction costs4°
that minority shareholders must incur.41
34. As investment bankers like to stress, a "fair" price is not the highest price obtainable, but
rather a price within the range that a reasonable and prudent board would accept. See Chazen,
Friedman & Feuerstein, supra note 21, at 147; Fleischer, A "Fairness Letter" is Just an Opinion,
N.Y. Tunes, June 8, 1986, § 3, at 2, col. 3.
35. See Weiss, supra note 24, at 256.
36. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h) (1983) (in determining fair value for purposes of
appraisal rights, court should ignore any value arising from accomplishment or expectation of
merger and consolidation); MODEL Bus. CoP. Acr § 13.01(3) (1985) (defining "fair value" for
purposes of dissenters' rights as excluding any "appreciation or depreciation in anticipation of the
corporate action unless exclusion would be inequitable").
37. See Easterbrook & Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, 91 YALE LJ. 698, 723-31
(1982) (minority shareholders should receive market value for shares in freeze-out merger); cf DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(bXl) (appraisal remedy not available in cases involving publicly traded
stock).
38. See Chazen, Friedman & Feuerstein, supra note 21, at 160 (price obtainable for minority
shares as block provides possible measure of fair price). These authors believe that the block price
would be below the market price, since investors would have to sell at a liquidity discount. If the
same person owned all the minority shares, however, he would have greater incentives and abilities
to monitor the majority shareholders. In such a case, the majority would presumably be less able to
divert gains from the minority, and the minority stock's block price might exceed the value of the
stock to dispersed investors.
39. See Brudney & Chirelstein, Fair Shares in Corporate Mergers and Takeovers, '88 HARV. L.
REv. 297, 345 (1974) (fair treatment requires that gains be shared).
40. Toms, Compensating Shareholders Frozen Out in Two-Step Mergers, 78 COLUM. L. REv.
548, 577 & n.104 (1978) (suggesting modification of traditional intrinsic value standard to compen-
sate for factors reducing actual value of frozen-out shareholder interests).
41. In other transactions, different definitions of fair price can be justified. For example, in a
management buyout, fair price might mean: a company's independent value, the market price of the
shares; the price obtainable in an auction; the independent value plus a fraction of the gains expected
from the buyout (eg., tax savings from increased leverage and gains from improved incentives to
managers); or the value of the company assuming management made all changes it planned to make
after the buyout (which would include tax savings from increased leverage but might not include
gains from improved incentives to managers). Cf. Lowenstein, ,anagement Buyouts; 85 COLUM. L.
REv. 730, 779-84 (1985) (arguing for an auction rule in leveraged buyouts).
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Investment bankers are free to choose from any of these defini-
tions.42 In part III we will suggest a twofold approach to help solve the
definitional problem: first, courts should clarify which definitions of fair
price they view as legitimate; second, investment banks should state the
definitions underlying their opinions. As explained below, however, the
definitional problem is not the only source of bankers' discretion. Even
in the absence of this definitional problem, investment banks would still
retain significant discretion because of the measurement problem.
B. The Measurement Problem
Even financial analyses that employ the same definition of fair price
can arrive at widely differing results.43 To measure fair price, however
defined, any analysis must make a variety of simplifications, assumptions,
and estimates. Since analysts simplify, assume, and estimate in different
ways" that are all reasonable and justifiable, they often arrive at different
estimates of fair price.45
Assume, for example, that the appropriate definition of fair price is a
company's independent value. An analyst must first decide whether he
should estimate this value by the value of the company's net assets,46 the
discounted value of the company's future profits,47 a multiple of past
earnings,48 the discounted value of future dividend payments, 49 the share
42. Managers sometimes select the definition of fairness that investment banks must use in
writing opinions. See, ag., Kaplan v. Goldsamt, 380 A.2d 556, 563 (Del. Ch. 1977) (in negotiated
share repurchase, bank asked to estimate cost of buying equivalent amount of shares through tender
offer); Longstreth, New ControlsforLewraged Buyoutm N.Y. Tunes, Nov. 6, 1983, § 3, at 3, col. 2
(bankers sometimes asked not to consider liquidation value).
43. Some courts have recognized the subjective nature of price estimates. See Radol v.
Thomas, 534 F. Supp. 1302, 1305 (S.D. Ohio 1982) (price estimates necessarily imprecise); Kaplan,
380 A.2d at 567 (valuation depends upon numerous subjective judgments); cf Kahn v. United States
Sugar Corp., No. 7313, slip op. at 18 (Del. Ch. Dec. 10, 1985) (Westlaw, 1985 WL 4449) (expert
valuations based on subjective judgments); Joseph v. Shell Oil Co., 482 A.2d 335, 341 (Del. Ch.
1984) (expert appraisers usually express different opinions even if using same data).
44. For examples of how different assumptions can influence estimates, see Kahn No. 7313,
slip op. at 18; Kaplan, 380 A.2d at 567 (estimates depend on approach taken by those rendering
them).
45. See also Fischel, supra note 12, at 1452 (discounted-cash-flow technique can "come up with
just about anything"); cf Note, supra note 12, at 124 (modern valuation techniques do not permit
investment bankers to determine fair price with absolute precision).
46. See, eg., Piemonte v. New Boston Garden Corp., 377 Mass. 719, 733, 387 N.E.2d 1145,
1153 (1979) (net asset value factor in determining fair value); Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Bade, 37
N.Y.2d 585, 587, 338 N.E.2d 614, 616, 376 N.Y.S.2d 103, 106 (1975) (same).
47. See, eg.. B. MALKIEL, A RANDOM WALK DOWN WALL STREET 115 (4th ed. 1985)
(describing fundamental analysis); see also Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 712 (Del. 1983).
48. See, eg., Kahn, No. 7313, slip op. at 19 (experts used multiples of past earnings to deter-
mine value); In re Valuation of Common Stock of Libby, McNeill & Libby, 406 A.2d 54, 65.66 (Me.
1979) (multiple of past earnings given weight of 40% in calculating fair value under appraisal
statute).
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price,5° or some average of these measures. 51
Suppose the analyst decides to estimate the company's value by the
discounted value of its future profits. She must then collect information
on which to base his estimates. At this stage, the analyst determines the
appropriate information sources, the required amount of information, the
accuracy of any company-supplied information, and the necessity of in-
dependently verifying that information.
Based on this information, the analyst must make assumptions
about increases in company costs, revenues, 52 and future tax rates. 53
These assumptions, in turn, depend on such unpredictable variables as
future inflation rates, new product development, market competition,
and the general political climate. Moreover, the analyst might have to
repeat her calculations for each of a company's product lines.
Finally, the analyst must estimate the discount rate for future prof-
its. Assume that the analyst decides to use the capital asset pricing
model to determine the discount rate. Even if she wanted to apply the
same discount rate in each time period and to each item of revenue and
cost, she would have to determine the risk-free rate, calculate the covari-
ance of cash flows with the company's market portfolio, and estimate the
market risk premium. 4
Assume that the impossible happens and two analysts agree that a
company will have profits of $100,000 in each coming year, but one ana-
lyst determines that the proper discount rate is eight percent a year while
the other believes the proper rate is ten percent a year. This two percent
difference in the discount rates will result in estimates that diverge by
twenty-five percent. The first analyst will estimate the company's value
at $1,250,000, while the second analyst will estimate it at $1,000,000 5
Of course, if the analysts do not agree on the amount of future profits,
49. PL BREALY & S. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 45 (2d ed. 1984).
50. See, ,g, Easterbrook & Fischel, Auctions and Sunk Costs in Tender Offers, 35 STAN. L
REv. 1, 13-14 & n.28 (1982) (liquid markets offer ready price for shares); Easterbrook & Fschel,
The Proper Role of a Target's Mar .gement in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARv. L. REv.
1161, 1165-67 (1981) (under efficient capital market theory, share price represents true value of
firm);, Schwartz, supra note 26, at 165; cf. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(bXl) (1983) (appraisal
rights not available for publicly traded stocks).
51. See, eg., Piemonte v. New Boston Garden Corp., 377 Mass. 719, 733, 387 N.E.2d 1145,
1153 (1979) (weighted average); Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Bade, 37 N.Y.2d 585, 587, 338 N.E.2d
614, 616, 376 N.Y.S.2d 103, 106 (1975).
52. See, eg. R. BREALY & S. MYERS, supra note 49, at 85-96.
53. See, e&, Herskowitz v. Nutri/System, Inc., 857 F.2d 179, 184 (3rd Cir. 1988) (fairness
opinion assumed tax laws would not change), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1315 (1989).
54. R. BREALY & S. MYERS, supra note 49, at 128-35 (describing how to apply the capital asset
pricing model).
55. One can obtain the present value of such a cash flow by dividing the annual flow by the
difference between the discount rate and the absolute rate of growth of the cash flow.
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their estimates might be even further apart.56 For example, if the first
analyst thinks profits will grow at an annual rate of four percent, and the
second analyst thinks they will grow at only two percent, their respective
estimates will be $2,500,000 and $1,250,000. These analyses-both legit-
imate under prevailing standards---would produce very different conclu-
sions about whether a price of, say, $2,000,000 is fair.
A different definition of fair price could complicate the estimation
process even more. Assume, for example, that fair price is defined as the
result of takeover negotiations conducted bilaterally and at arm's length,
which presumably includes part of the net gains from an acquisition. As-
sume that an analyst hired by the acquiring corporation first estimates
the value of the acquiring company as an independent entity. Next, he
estimates the value of the target company as an independent entity and
the value of both companies together. From these three figures, the ana-
lyst then calculates the net gains from the transaction.
Estimating the value of the target company and of both companies
together creates even greater leeway than estimating just the value of the
acquiring company. The analyst will ordinarily have less information-
and will thus be forced to make more estimates-about the target com-
pany than about the company that hired him. Similarly, the analyst will
often not know how the surviving company will be managed, and even if
he did, determining the effects on value would leave a wide margin of
tolerance.
Finally, in deciding how to split the net gains from the acquisition,
the analyst can justify the-use of several estimation methods. The analyst
might assess how companies in other transactions have split gains; alter-
natively, he might assume that gains would be divided equally, on a per-
dollar basis,57 on a percentage of independent value basis,58 or on some
other basis.
In sum, however fair price is defined, an investment bank might base
its estimate on a variety of justifiable information sources, assumptions,
and measurement techniques.5 9 By relying on different sources of infor-
56. Statistically independent estimates of each item would limit differences between analysts'
estimates as a whole. The estimates on each item would tend to balance the estimate as a whole: an
analyst who makes a relatively high estimate of the profits on product A might make a relatively low
estimate of the profits on product B.
There are, however, two reasons to believe that estimates on each item are not independent.
First, some analysts might take a generally positive or negative approach to the developments in the
company's industry or the economy in general. Second, as part III will show, analysts have incen-
tives to arrive at price estimates that satisfy the managers that hired them.
57. See Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 39, at 316.
58. See id. at 320-21.
59. Even if an analyst regards the stock price as the fair price, he must decide whether to
include or ignore several factors: a prospective transaction's impact, the timing of disclosure for that
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mation, making different assumptions, and using different techniques,
banks might arrive at widely different results. Even if no definitional
problem existed, investment banks would retain significant discretion.
II. THE PROBLEM OF CONFLICTS OF ITEREST
The existence of substantial discretion would present significant
problems to those wishing to rely on fairness opinions even if bankers
faced no conflict of interest. Even if all bankers sought to render opin-
ions best reflecting their judgment, the presence of discretion would im-
ply that any one opinion might only reflect one banker's opinion and, as
such, differ markedly from opinions that other analysts would reach. As
this part explains, however, the existence of discretion presents an espe-
dally severe problem because bankers do face significant conflicts of in-
terest. Bankers are thus likely to use their discretion to render opinions
that serve the interests of managers. By managers, we refer to those of-
ficers and directors of corporations who wield the power to select invest-
ment bankers and set their compensation schemes. 60 For example, if
managers want shareholders to approve a merger, banks will tend to con-
clude that the merger terms are fair. On the other hand, if managers
want to adopt defenses to a hostile takeover, banks will tend to conclude
that the proposed takeover terms are unfair.
This Part demonstrates the pervasiveness of such conflicts of interest
by analyzing their sources and by refuting the alleged grounds for the
independence of investment bankers. The Part first considers in detail
the causes of conflicts of interest: the fee structure for compensating in-
vestment banks and the incentives that structure creates, the banks' de-
sire to retain and attract clients, and psychological and social factors.
Lastly, this Part argues that investment banks' reputational concerns and
internal procedures will not eliminate these conflicts of interest.
transaction, and the effect of this information on the stock price. Cf Fischel, The Appraisal Remedy
in Corporate Law, 1983 AM. B. FOUND. R. J. 875, 893-94 (describing econometric market model
for reconstructing market price while excluding effects of a prospective corporate control
transacion).
60. Many have expressed the view that fairness opinions often do nothing more than rubber-
stamp management decisions. See, eg.. McGough, Fairnessfor Hire FoRBEs, July 29, 1985, at 52;
Weiss, supra note 24, at 255; Note, supra note 12, at 127-28; Stein, Investment Banking's Dirty Little
Secret, N.Y. Times, June 8, 1986, § 3, at 2, col. 3; Longstreth, supra note 42, at 3, cols. 3-4; see also
Fischel, supra note 14, at 1453 (some experts always willing to opine that price significantly higher
than share price is fair). Thus, the contribution of this part lies not in the novelty of its claim that a
conflict-of-interest problem exists but rather in its systematic analysis of the factors producing this
problem.
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A. The Fee Structure
One reason why investment banks have an incentive to write fair-
ness opinions consistent with managerial desires stems from the fee struc-
ture under which banks are compensated. An investment bank generally
does more than just write the fairness opinion for a transaction; the same
bank often controls other financial aspects of the transaction.61 For ex-
ample, in a merger, a bank writing a fairness opinion might also give a
company general financial advice;62 in a hostile takeover defense, the
bank might arrange financial aspects of a lock-up option63 or a poison
pill.64
Although banks often receive a fixed fee for fairness opinions,6 5
other fees that investment banks receive are frequently contingent. 66 For
example, in many friendly deals, a significant fraction of the total fee is
payable on the condition that the transaction is consummated, 67 and the
size of this contingent fee may depend on the company's sale price.68 In
other instances, fees are contingent on a raider's failure in a proxy chal-
61. See Chazen, supra note 1, at 1442-43 (typically, fairness opinion is only one of several
services furnished by investment bank); see also Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250,
257 (7th Cir. 1986) (investment bank provided fairness opinion and advice on proxy fight), rvv 481
U.S. 69 (1987), MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings v. Revlon, Inc., 501 A.2d 1239, 1243-44 (DeL Ch.
1985) (investment bank wrote fairness opinion and structured hostile tender defense), aff'L 506
A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
62. See, eg. Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc., 458 F.2d 255, 267 (3d Cir. 1972) (bank
served as general financial adviser during amalgamation discussions), cert denied, 409 U.S. 874
(1972); Gerstle v. Gambk-Skogmo,*Inc., 298 F. Supp. 66, 82-83 (E.D.N.Y. 1969) (bank provided
services involving debt issue prior to merger), modified, 478 F.2d 1281 (2d Cir. 1973);, Alleghany
Corp. & Investors Diversified Serv. Inc., supra note 9, at 21 (Alleghany's investment bank to receive
fees for financial advice and fairness opinion).
63. See eg., Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d 264, 270-71 (2d Cir.
1986) (Goldman Sachs structured lock-up option and declared that it was fair).
64. See eg., Dynamics Corp., 794 F.2d at 257-58 (Smith Barney structured poison pill and
wrote opinion that tender offer was unfair).
65. See, eg. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 706 (Del. 1983) (Lehman Brothers re-
ceived S150,000 for fairness opinion).
66. Investment banks usually receive a single fee for all services involving one transaction.
Confidential interview with Shearson Lehman Hutton personnel (Nov. 1988).
67. For example, in the acquisition of ABC by Capital Cities, ABC's bank was to receive $2
million if ABC's shareholders approved the deal and $4.5 million if'the deal was finalized. American
Broadcasting Companies, Inc. & Capital Cities Communications, Inc., Joint Proxy Statement 7
(May 10, 1985).
68. See, eg., Radol v. Thomas, 534 F. Supp. 1302, 1315 n.19 (S.D. Ohio 1982) (investment
bank received base fee plus 1% of share price in excess of $85); Joseph v. Shell Oil Co., 482 A.2d
335, 339 (DeL Ch. 1984) (investment bank received fixed sum plus a bonus dependent on price
eventually paid for minority shares). See generally Carrington, Merger Advisers Say the Big Fees
They're Charging Are Warranted, Wall St. J., July 17, 1981, at 29, col. 3, col. 4 (in friendly deals,
seller's investment bank usually receives percentage fee).
FAIRNESS OPINIONS
lenge,69 on the bank's recruitment of a white knight,70 or on the com-
pany's making the fairness opinion public.71
Fees contingent on a transaction's consummation create enormous
incentives for investment bankers to help execute deals.72 In such situa-
tions, investment banks face two alternatives: they can earn contingent
fees if they characterize management proposals as fair, or they can garner
modest fees if deals collapse as a result of their opinions.73
For instance, in the merger of Cleveland Electric and Toledo
Edison, Morgan Stanley was to receive $3.794 million if the companies
actually merged, but only $350,000 otherwise.74 In the acquisition of
Allied Stores by Campeau, Goldman Sachs was to receive a straight fee
of $1 million and an additional fee in the amount of one-third of one
percent (estimated to be $13 million) of the total price paid for Allied
shares, minus the $1 million straight fee.75
Another example is the involvement of Smith Barney in Dynamics'
hostile tender offer and proxy contest for CTS. CTS retained the bank to
write a fairness opinion on the tender offer and to give other financial
advice.76 If Dynamics, the hostile raider, lost the proxy contest, Smith
Barney would receive a bonus of $75,000.77 Thus, Smith Barney had an
incentive to find the tender offer unfair. If Smith Barney had found the
tender offer fair, Dynamics would have been more likely to win the con-
test and the bank would have lost its bonus. Similarly, if a bank's fees are
contingent on the appearance of a white knight the bank has incentives
to find the original raider's offer unfair; if fees are contingent on the opin-
69. See, eg., Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250, 257 (7th Cir. 1986) (in
hostile tender offer, investment bank hired to determine fairness received bonus if hostile suitor lost
proxy fight), rev'd, 481 U.S. 69 (1987).
70. See, eg, RadoA 534 F. Supp. at 1315 (bank's fee contingent upon success of white knight's
tender offer).
71. See, eg., Herskowitz v. Nutri/System, Inc., 857 F.2d 179, 18313d Cir. 1988) (bank re-
ceived S75,000 if opinion published and $50,000 if not), cert denied, 109 S. Ct. 1315 (1989); Ander-
son v. Boothe, 103 F.RLD. 430, 435 (D. Minn. 1984) (bank received fixed fee of $250,000 for opinion
and additional $150,000 if opinion liade publicly available).
72. See Anderson, 103 F.R.D. at 436 (contingent fees could bias fairness opinion); Note, supra
note 12, at 128 (contingent fees create conflict of interest).
73. To be sure, an investment bank's judgment that a price is unfair does not necessarily de-
stroy a deal; nor does an opinion that the proposed terms are fair ensure a transaction's consumma-
tion. As long as a favorable opinion increases the chances of a deal's consummation, though,
investment banks will face the incentives we describe.
74. Centerior Energy Corp., Cleveland Elec. llum'n Co. & Toledo Edison Co., Joint Proxy
Statement 12 (Oct. 4, 1985).
75. Allied Stores Corp., Information Statement 9 (Dec. 9, 1986).
76. Dynamics Corp. ofAm. v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250,257 (7th Cir. 1986), rev'd, 481 U.S. 69
(1987).
77. Id
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ion's publication, a bank will have an incentive to render an opinion
favorable to management interests.
Since banks are compensated primarily for services other than writ-
ing fairness opinions, they have incentives to render pro-management
opinions even in situations involving noncontingent fees, because such
opinions will typically generate more work than opposition opinions.78
For example, a merger-killing negative opinion will destroy all the busi-
ness that a merger would have created for a bank. Thus, even under a
noncontingent fee scheme, banks' pro-management opinions create
higher revenues (and profits). The difference in incentives between con-
tingent and noncontingent fees is therefore only a matter of degree: in-
vestment banks compensated on the basis of work performed will face
smaller (but still positive) incentives to generate pro-management opin-
ions than will banks compensated on a contingent basis.79
Some investment bankers and commentators argue that contingent
fees operate in a different way: under a compensation scheme that makes
fees a percentage of the final deal price, banks maximize fees by seeking
high prices.8 0 Thus, the scheme provides banks with incentives to find
deals unfair in order to induce higher sales prices. However, only contin-
gent fees that depend on final sales prices ("percentage fees") provide
such countervailing incentives to a seller's investment bank, and fees are
often contingent on other factors."' For example, they can be contingent
on a deal's execution but not be derived from the price payable to share-
holders.8 2 Such contingent fees create no countervailing incentives, and
purchase prices under such a scheme are not likely to increase.
78. Management might desire an opinion that a particular merger proposal or tender offer is
unfair in order to justify defensive tactics. In some cases, the fees that banks can earn in the pre-
vented corporate control transactions might be larger than the fees from structuring the defenses.
Even in such cases, though, investment banks will have an incentive to render the opinion desired by
management. If the bank were to issue an opinion favoring the transaction, management would in
all likelihood not retain the writing bank for the control transaction, and the bank would not profit
from larger fees. If the bank writes the opinion desired by management, it will at least earn the small
fees for structuring the defenses.
79. Incentives to write pro-management opinions under a contingent fee system will be larger
than those generated under a noncontingent fee system only if an investment bank has worked on a
deal prior to writing the fairness opinion at issue. In such a case, the fairness opinion will affect both
the expected profits from any work to be done in the future and the compensation for work already
completed. If, however, the bank has rendered no other services before writing the fairness opinion,
incentives under both compensation systems should be equal. Under either system, the fairness
opinion will affect expected profits from work to be done in the future, and there is no reason to
assume that these expected profits are larger if the bank is compensated on a contingency basis.
80. See e.g., Fleischer, supra note 34, at 2, col. 4 (contingent fees act as incentive for invest-
ment banks to obtain highest possible price).
81. See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
82. See, eg., Beatrice Cos., Proxy Statement 12 (Mar. 11, 1986) (fee of $15 million payable
immediately when merger consummated; otherwise payable in installments).
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Moreover, even with respect to percentage fees, a bank that rejects a
proposed price as unfair must consider the possibility that such a rejec-
tion will jeopardize the entire deal.8 3 An attempt to push up the price
will pay only if the likelihood of killing the deal is relatively small. As-
sume, for example, that an investment bank stands to receive 0.1% of the
purchase price on consummation of a deal. A bank would benefit from
trying to raise the price from $100 million to $110 million only if the
probability of killing the deal were less than approximately 10%. Thus,
even with percentage fees, banks often would not attempt to increase
purchase prices.
In summary, both contingent and noncontingent fee structures cre-
ate incentives for investment banks to write opinions aligned with man-
agement interests. Under contingent fee structures, pro-management
opinions increase the likelihood that the specified contingencies will take
place; under noncontingent fee schemes, such opinions increase the
amount of work available to the writing, bank. In both cases, pro-man-
agement opinions increase investment banks' revenues.
B. The Desire to Attract and Retain Clients
Assume, as before, that an investment bank receives 0.1% of the
purchase price if a potential sale is consummated. Assume further that
the bank perceives only a 5% chance that increasing the price from $100
million to, $110 million will kill the transaction. A bank attempting to
maximize its fees should try to increase the purchase price, because the
expected fee from the sale would increase from $100,000 to $104,500.
In each transaction, however, an investment bank must consider
both the possible fees from this particular transaction and the impact of
that transaction on future business. Investment banks have an incentive
to write opinions that attract future clients. The ultimate question, then,
remains: what do clients want from investment banks when they retain
them to write fairness opinions? Investment banks that deliver what cli-
ents want will attract futuW business; investment banks that do not, will
not.
Although formally an investment bank's clients are corporations
themselves, it is certain officers and directors-referred to here as manag-
ers-who select investment banks. Since managers decide which invest-
ment banks to hire, banks will attract business by satisfying managers.
Because managers are likely to be well informed about an investment
83. Note that fees of investment banks representing buyers are sometimes a percentage of the
sales price. See egg, Carrington, supra note 68, at 29, col. 4 (First Boston, representing du Pont in
its bid for Conoco, received 0.2% of sales price as fee). Apparently, in these instances, buyers do not
believe that such fees create strong incentives for investment banks to increase sales prices.
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bank's reputation and its approach to fairness opinions, the bank's per-
formance affects its future employment prospects with both its present
client and other potential clients. In particular, one would imagine that
word would quickly spread if an investment bank killed a deal by trying
to increase the purchase price of a corporation. Furthermore, major law
firms retained by managers provide information about the reputation of,
most investment banks. Thus, incentives created by investment banks'
desire to be hired for future transactions are potentially much stronger
than incentives created by fee structures in an individual transaction.
Because investment banks have strong incentives to satisfy manag-
ers, fairness opinions are unlikely to serve as an effective independent
check on managerial activity. To the contrary, the desire to retain and
attract clients will lead investment banks to write the fairness opinions
that managers wish to see. Banks that adapt their fairness opinions to
the wishes of managers will tend to be rehired, whereas banks that write
contrary opinions are less likely to be retained.
C. Psychological and Social Factors
The psychological and social loyalty that investment bankers some-
times feel toward managers reinforces the economic incentives created by
the fee structure and by the desire to retain and attract clients. Because
many investment bankers personally know the managers who hired
them,8 bankers tend to feel more sympathetic to managers than to
shareholders and tend to place greater weight on managerial goals and
views. As a result, fairness opinions often favor managerial interests.85
Even in the absence.of personal relations between bankers and man-
agers, though, many transactions create an atmosphere of common pur-
pose that tends to reduce bankers' objectivity.86 For instance, a bank
evaluating a transaction may have assisted managers in creating and
structuring that transaction. 7 Or, a bank retained to defend against a
hostile takeover might help to search for a white knight. 8 In such in-
84. See. eg., Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 706 (Del. 1983) (fairness opinion pre-
pared by investment banker who was also a longtime director of UOP).
85. Cf Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 298 F. Supp. 66, 95 (E.D.N.Y. 1969) (prior business
relation raises doubts about investment bank's impartiality), modified, 478 F.2d 1281 (2d Cir. 1973).
86. See. eg., MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings v. Revlon, Inc., 501 A.2d 1239, 1243 (Del. Ch.
1985) (investment bank and management together developed defensive share repurchase plan and
poison pill), aff'd, 506 A,2d 173 (Del. 1986).
87. See eg., Gersdte 298 F. Supp. at 95 (structuring merger and evaluating its fairness
"blurred" investment bank's "lenses," resulting in failure to note erroneous property valuation).
88. See, e-g., Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d 264, 268-69, 271 (2d
Cir. 1986) (investment banker involved both in preparation of fairness opinion and in search for
white knight).
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stances, bankers and managers share a team spirit,8 9 even a siege mental-
ity. In addition, banks and corporations often establish continuing
relationships that add to this collaborative atmosphere.90 These relation-
ships may lead bankers to give undue weight to managers' goals, at the
cost of shareholder interests.
D. Objections to the Analysis
This section discusses and rejects the commonly given reasons why
bankers are likely to write fairness opinions that reflect their best, unbi-
ased judgments. In particular, the section argues: first, that a concern
for professional reputation does not lead investment banks to render un-
biased fairness opinions, and second, that internal procedures and guide-
lines fail to eliminate the conflicts of interest facing investment banks.
1. Pmfessional Reputation. One familiar argument holds that in-
vestment banks' desire to maintain a professional reputation may lead
them to provide unbiased fairness opinions. A professional reputation
for quality work is an important asset to an investment bank, so the argu-
ment goes, and banks might well be reluctant to jeopardize such a repu-
tation by writing biased opinions. Managers use these opinions to
convince courts that fiduciary duties have been met and to persuade
shareholders to approve transactions. 91 Since courts and shareholders
would place less weight on fairness opinions known to be biased, banks
have a clear interest in upholding their reputation for unbiased opinions.
Courts, however, have not indicated that they pay close attention to
the trustworthiness of fairness opinions written by specific banks.92
Rather, courts fail to differentiate among investment banks as long as
89. See, &, MacAndrema & Forbes, 501 A.2d at 1243 (investment bankers, managers, and
la~'yers together developed program to protect company against tender offer).
90. For example, Merrill Lyncyrepresented Alleghany in its merger with Investors Diversified
Services (lI)S) in 1979. Prior to that Merrill Lynch had represented Alleghany in its 1975 merger
with MIS; in a 1977 tender offer for IDS stock, twice in 1977 with respect to IDS Realty Trust; and
again in 1978 with respect to the trust. In total, Merrill Lynch earned revenues of over $500,000 in
these transactions. Similarly, in the three years prior to the Alleghany merger, Salomon Brothers,
which represented IDS, had earned about $4.5 million from earlier representation of IDS. Alle-
ghany Corp. & Investors Diversified Servs. Inc., supra note 9, at 27-28.
91. See supra notes 11-15 and accompanying text.
92. In the acquisition of Stokely-Van Camp, Dillon Read, an investment bank, advised the
directors that the proposed price of $55 in a management buyout was fair. Quaker Oats eventually
acquired Stokely for $77 per share and Quaker Oats apparently made significant profits in the deal.
McGough, supra note 60, at 52. Nonetheless, courts have not discounted fairness opinions issued by
Dillon Read. See, eg., Cottle v. Storer Communication, Inc., 849 F.2d 570, 578 (1 1th Cir. 1988)
(fairness opinion by Dillon Read given weight).
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those banks have sufficient credentials. 93 Furthermore, to the extent that
courts do pay attention to professional reputation, they are likely to eval-
uate fairness opinions on the basis of a bank's general reputation rather
than on the basis of its reputation with respect to fairness opinions.94
Shareholders, while they might pay more attention to the general reputa-
tion of investment banks, are likely to have less specific information
about investment banks than managers have. Shareholders are, at most,
aware of the general reputation of investment banks,95 and this knowl-
edge alone should not preclude managers from selecting an investment
bank that is willing to write a pro-management opinion.96 Thus, invest-
ment banks that enjoy a broad reputation for providing high-quality
work will still have incentives to write pro-management fairness
opinions.
To maintain credibility with courts and shareholders, investment
banks need only avoid writing fairness opinions that they cannot reason-
ably justify. That is, investment banks must not opine that utterly unrea-
sonable prices are fair or that clearly fair prices are inadequate. If a
particular bank's opinions were repeatedly outside this range of legiti-
mate fair prices, its reputation would decline so noticeably that courts
and shareholders would give less weight to its opinions. As part I points
out, however, such a reasonableness requirement imposes only a limited
constraint on choices available to investment banks; banks may still write
pro-management opinions as long as their opinions remain within this
range of legitimate fair prices.
2. Internal Procedures and Guidelines. One might also argue
that internal procedures and guidelines ensure that investment banks
write unbiased opinions. A bank will issue fairness opinions only accord-
ing to these procedures and guidelines. For example, some investment
93. Cf Kahn v. United States Sugar Corp., No. 7313, slip op. at 29 (Del. Ch. Dec. 10, 1985)
(Westlaw, 1985 WL 4449) (noting "impressive credentials" of experts that valued same company at
$52 and $122 per share, respectively).
94. See eg., Denison Mines Ltd. v. Fibreboard Corp., 388 F. Supp. 812, 821 (D. Del. 1974)
(noting reputation of Lehman Brothers in investment banking field).
95. Cf. id. (finding it difficult to overestimate impact to shareholders of reference to Lehman
Brothers).
96. One might wonder why courts and shareholders do not pay closer attention to the reputa-
tion of investment banks. One reason why courts do not scrutinize reputation might be that legally
admissible evidence will not provide a reliable picture of reputation. Another possible reason is that
all reputable investment banks give pro-management fairness opinions. Thus, a court could not
denounce a particular bank's behavior as different from the norm; all that courts could possibly do is
to criticize the behavior of the whole investment banking industry. Shareholders, of course, lack the
incentives to acquire information about the reputation of investment banks, because most of them
own only a small fraction of a company's shares and because their vote is unlikely to make a
difference.
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banks have established internal committees that monitor the issuance of
fairness opinions.97
A primary reason for establishing these procedures or guidelines,
however, is to ensure that individual bankers act in the interest of the
investment bank as a whole.98 If it is in the interest of the bank itself to
write pro-management opinions, procedures and guidelines will direct
employees to do the same. Internal procedures and guidelines thus
should tend to produce fairness opinions that increase fees and help to
retain and attract cients.99
To be sure, guidelines and procedures have some beneficial effect on
the quality of fairness opinions. In order to maintain a professional repu-
tation, banks are likely to write guidelines and procedures ensuring that
all fairness opinions have a reasonable basis.' °° Furthermore, internal
procedures and guidelines might try to limit the psychological and social
factors which lead individual bankers to issue an opinion that is more
pro-management than is in the bank's interest. However, the incentives
to render pro-management opinions that are created by the fee structure
and the desire to retain and attract clients affect the interest of the bank
itself, rather than only the interests of individual bankers. Therefore, in-
ternal procedures and guidelines should be expected to solidify, rather
than reduce, the force of these pro-management incentives.
97. Shearson Lehman Hutton has a committee that monitors all fairness opinions before they
are issued. Confidential interview, supra note 66.
98. Another reason, presumably, is to avoid legal liability arising from fairness opinions. In
that case, the procedures and guidelines can be expected to reach as far as potential legal liability.
But to establish liability shareholders must establish that the investment banker knowingly misrepre-
sented the contents of a fairness opinion. See Note, supra note 12, at 128-30 (reviewing the stan-
dards for investment banker liability under both federal and state law). Even under a negligence
rule, investment bankers would not be liable for a fairness opinion that could be reasonably justified.
99. The various formulations iud in fairness opinions might illustrate how guidelines can pro-
duce pro-management opinions. In mergers, fairness opinions conventionally state whether the
terms are fair, Le., within a range of values a reasonable prudent board would accept. In hostile
tender offers, fairness opinions state whether the terms are adequate, i.e., whether better terms could
be obtained. See Weiss, supra note 24, at 256. Since terms must generally be higher to be adequate
than to be fair, terms that are fair in mergers (which the managers generally like to approve) are
inadequate in hostile tender offers (which the managers generally do not like to approve). The lack
of specific guidelines can also serve these purposes. Shearson Lehman Hutton, for example, has no
written guidelines and no fixed standards for issuing fairness opinions. Rather, each case is evalu-
ated individually. Confidential interview, supra note 66. Such an ad hoc approach would enable a
bank, if it so desired, to conform the content of the fairness opinion to the wishes of the
management.
100. For instance, Shearson Lehman Hutton considers various measures of fairness before it
issues a fairness opinion. Confidential interview, supra note 66.
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III. A RECOMMENDED JUDICIAL APPROACH
This part suggests a judicial approach for dealing with the problems
analyzed above. By following this approach, courts can reduce both the
discretion that investment banks currently possess and the conflicts of
interest that they face. Sections A, B, and C explain, respectively, how
courts should scrutinize the definition of fairness, the measurement of
fair price, and the banker-company relationship. Finally, Section D sug-
gests that, even with such scrutiny, courts should still exercise substantial
residual caution in dealing with fairness opinions.
A. Scrutinizing the Definition of Fair Price
The two most natural ways to attack the mutiple-definition problem
are: first, for courts to clarify the definitions of fairness that banks should
use while preparing opinions, and second, for banks to disclose the defini-
tion underlying each opinion. Courts should recognize the conceptual
confusion that surrounds the definition of fairness and try to build a sys-
tem of definitions through precedent. These precedents will, over time,
establish definitions appropriate to each context. Although these prece-
dents alone may not eliminate all uncertainty about the proper definition
of fairness, it is likely to reduce the range of definitions that are arguably
proper in any one transaction.
In particular, courts should examine the different standards that in-
vestment banks use to evaluate friendly deals and hostile deals. In
friendly transactions, banks couch opinions in terms of fairness (Would a
rational board accept the offer?), whereas in hostile deals banks evaluate
offers in terms of adequacy (Can a higher offer be obtained?). 01 Unless
courts conclude that these different standards are warranted, they should
not give weight to fairness opinions written in this fashion. 1°2
At the same time, courts should require that investment banks ex-
plicitly state the definitions of fairness used in preparing their opinions.
Banks should be free to use several definitions if they so desire; in that
case, however, banks should state under which definitions the price is
fair, and under which definitions the price is unfair. For example, an
opinion should not state that a price is fair from a financial point of view;
rather, it should state that the price is fair compared to the pre-merger-
announcement stock price or fair compared to the price the company
101. See Weiss, supra note 24, at 256.
102. See id. (in take-out mergers, fairness opinions should be framed in terms of adequacy, not
fairness).
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would carry in an auction.103
The inclusion of explicit definitions of fairness will assist judicial
analysis of fairness opinions. The respect accorded any given fairness
opinion should depend on whether the definitions used in the opinion's
preparation conform to the appropriate contextual definitions. Thus, if
courts have established a proper definition, investment banks will know
exactly how to prepare opinions that the courts will respect. But even if
such a definition is not judicially established when a fairness opinion is
written, courts will be able to judge the extent to which the definition
used deviates from the proper definition and then decide how much
weight to give the fairness opinion.
This approach is not overly demanding. It neither requires that fair-
ness opinions use the judicially established definitions nor requires that
companies obtain fairness opinions. If, however, a company does obtain
a fairness opinion, the opinion should explicitly state the definitions it
uses. And, as courts determine which definitions are proper, they should
indicate them to enable companies to obtain opinions based on those defi-
nitions, and courts should give weight only to opinions that use such
definitions.
B. Scrutinizing the Measurement of Fair Price
The problem of evaluating bankers' measurement processes is more
difficult to solve. Price estimates are inherently imprecise. Courts are
unable (and should not attempt) to specify in advance what assumptions
bankers should make and what valuation techniques they should use. 1°4
Rather, courts should weigh an opinion depending on whether it states a
range of fair prices °5 and on the extent to which its conclusion is sensi-
tive to its assumptions. Thereby, fairness opinions will convey more in-
formation and investment banks will have less discretion.
103. One might wonder why investment bankers have not themselves clarified the definitions of
fair price. One reason why the confusion has remained might be, as we suggested in part II, that
managers benefit from it: the less defined the concept of fair price, the higher the discretion to the
investment bankers, and the greater their opportunity to arrive at a satisfactory opinion.
104. Cf Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 713 (Del. 1983) (all generally accepted valua-
tion techniques may be used to estimate fair value for purposes of appraisal rights). Note that the
standard for fairness opinions should be based on valuation techniques used in estimating prices for
purposes other than fairness opinions. If the standards were based on techniques used solely for
fairness opinions, the investment banking industry would tend to develop standards that would make
it easy to render pro-management opinions.
105. Investment banks are often reluctant to specify numbers for fair prices. Chazen, Friedman
& Feuerstein, supra note 21, at 146. However, in some cases, they are apparently willing to give
ranges of fair prices. See, eg. Kahn v. United States Sugar Corp., No. 7313, slip op. at 30 (Del. Ch.
Dec. 10, 1985) (Westlaw, 1985 WL 4449) (Bear Stearns gives price range of $62 to $68 per share).
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In concluding that a price is fair without giving a range of prices,
banks can base opinions on barely reasonable assumptions. For example,
if reasonable fair stock prices for a company involved in a merger range
from $50 to $90 per share, a bank will have no difficulty in justifying an
opinion that a merger price of $55 is fair. If banks are forced to give a
range of fair prices, however, it will become harder for them to make bad
deals look good. Because assumptions become more difficult to justify as
they become more extreme, banks will be unable to come up with arbi-
trary price ranges. For instance, a bank might arrive at $50 to $70 as a
fair price range, with the merger price of $55 close to the bottom of this
range. With a lower price range, however (say, $45 to $65), the bank
might open itself to attack with respect to the (fairly unreasonable) as-
sumptions that resulted in a $45 estimate. In such an example, directors
would incur the risk of censure for accepting a blatantly biased fairness
opinion, and banks would incur the risk of gaining a reputation for ren-
dering unreasonable opinions.
Analyzing the sensitivity of price estimates to assumptions serves
the same purpose as requiring specification of fair-price ranges. In per-
forming sensitivity analyses, analysts construct a base scenario and then
show how the outcome of that scenario varies with changes in assump-
tions.106 In showing how estimates change as assumptions vary, this
analysis indicates the type of assumptions one must make for a seemingly
fair price to become unfair. A sensitivity analysis, like specification of
price ranges, will tend to show how fair or unfair a price is, not merely
whether the price is fair or not.
In giving weight to fairness opinions, courts should consider
whether a corporation's directors have been told a range of fair prices
and the results of a sensitivity analysis. Take a hostile tender offer as an
example: if directors approve a defensive measure, a fairness opinion
should receive greater weight if the directors were informed that the hos-
tile bid was significantly below the range of fair prices and would remain
below such a range even if certain (specified) assumptions were modified,
and less weight if directors were merely told that the price was inade-
quate, was in the middle of the range of fair prices, or was unfair under
some "reasonable" assumptions but fair under other "reasonable"
assumptions.
Finally, in certain sufficiently unusual situations, courts should be
willing even to engage in an independent review of the reasonableness of
the assumptions and techniques 0 7 used to prepare fairness opinions and,
106. See generally R. BREALY & S. MYERS, supra note 49, at 195-202.
107. See, e.g., Kahn, No. 7313, slip op. at 29-33 (court examined assumptions on which valua-
tions were based).
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in turn, the reasonableness of directors' reliance on those opinions. 10°8
Such scrutiny, of course, requires that banks disclose their assumptions
and techniques to directors and to courtsY°9
However, even if all these steps are taken, investment banks will
retain a significant amount of discretion. Bankers can reasonably differ
on the upper and lower limits of fair price ranges and on methods of
performing sensitivity analyses. And courts must allow directors to rely
on a variety of reasonable assumptions and techniques. Thus, our ap-
proach will only constrain-but not eliminate--investment banks' ability
to manipulate fair-price measurements.
C. Scrutinizing the Banker-Company Relationship
As discussed,110 the nature of the relationship between investment
banks and corporations creates conflicts of interest that tend to produce a
pro-management bias in fairness opinions. Courts should reduce this
bias by scrutinizing the banker-corporation relationship. As a first step,
courts should discount fairness opinions for which any part of the bank's
fee is contingent. Fees contingent on results other than the eventual
purchase price are especially suspect because they give banks no counter-
vailing incentives to increase the purchase price. Although some courts
have realized that investment banks in such situations hardly function as
independent and objective advisors,"1 most courts have not expressed
such concerns about contingent fee arrangements.11 2
One might respond that contingent fees create efficiencies that make
their use desirable. In particular, contingent fees may give investment
banks performance incentives. For example, fees contingent on the price
shareholders receive for their shares will give banks an incentive to in-
crease the purchase price. Fees that are contingent on winning a proxy
contest or on procuring a white knight will provide incentives to assist in
the proxy contest or to look for a white knight.
108. See. e.g, Hanson Trust PLC v. MIL SCM Acquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d 264, 275 (2d Cir.
1986) (directors obligated to become reasonably familiar with investment banker's report); see also
Note, supra note 12, at 134 (directors should be able to rely only on fairness opinions that conform
to accepted standards in investment banking industry).
109. Proxy statements do not generally include calculations made in arriving at their fairness
opinion. Cf Chazen, Friedman & Feuerstein, supra note 21, at 151 (calculations usually not
helpful).
110. See supra notes 60-99 and accompanying text.
111. See Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTs Corp., 794 F.2d 250, 257 (7th Cir. 1986) (Posner, J.)
(critical comment on incentives created by contingent fee), rev'd, 481 U.S. 69 (1987).
112. Many opinions fail to mention that the investment bank involved received a contingent fee.
See eg., Cottle v. Storer Communication, Inc., 849 F.2d 570, 578 (11th Cir. 1988).
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We do not suggest, however, that investment banks should be pro-
hibited from negotiating and executing any type of fee arrangement, in-
cluding contingent fees.113 Rather, we only point out that courts must
recognize the inevitable conflicts of interest that contingent fees create
and should accordingly discount fairness opinions written under contin-
gent fee arrangements.
Note that the beneficial incentives created by contingent fees do not
relate to fairness opinions themselves; rather, the incentives operate with
respect to other services provided by investment banks. If managers
want both unbiased fairness opinions and contingent fee arrangements,
they can hire a second investment bank solely to write a fairness opinion.
By doing so, they maintain incentives for the bank in charge of the bulk
of a transaction without creating a conflict of interest for the bank writ-
ing the fairness opinion. Managers, though, remain free to obtain fair-
ness opinions from banks compensated under contingent fees (opinions
to which courts will give less weight) or, for that matter, to obtain no
fairness opinions whatsoever.
Hiring a second investment bank-preferably one that is not in-
volved in other aspects of the transaction and has no longstanding rela-
tionship with the corporation-is preferable to eliminating the
contingent fee for other reasons as well. As we have shown, even non-
contingent fees create incentives to render pro-management fairness
opinions; these pro-management opinions usually help to create follow-
up work for the writing bank. If, however, a bank writing a fairness
opinion is not involved with other aspects of the transaction, such a bank
will not be influenced by the possibility that a particular fairness opinion
might create more work. Furthermore, hiring an "outside" bank will
reduce the psychological and social factors that tend to create pro-man-
agement fairness opinions. A second investment bank will be at a dis-
tance from the transaction and thus more likely to write a more neutral
opinion.
Retaining a second investment bank just to write a fairness opinion
will of course create some costs. This second bank will have to duplicate
some of the lead bank's work. Lacking familiarity with the company, an
"outside" bank will need to do more work to determine fair prices than
would an investment bank that already knows the company. A second
bank might also be hard to find. By writing a fairness opinion for a fairly
small fee, such a bank disqualifies itself from representing other potential
113. One might draw an analogy, though, to the position of public accountants, which is similar
to that of investment bankers. Managers hire accountants in order to certify books prepared under
management supervision. Accountants, however, may not be compensated by contingent fees.
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL ETHics § 302, Rule 302.01 (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 1988).
[Vol. 1989:27/
FAIRNESS OPINIONS
bidders for the company and earning a significantly larger fee. Lastly,
although the second investment bank earns only a relatively small fee, it
stands to bear all the possible liability. 114
One should not, however, exaggerate the extent of these costs. The
cost of issuing a fairness opinion is often trivial in relation to the amounts
involved in a transaction as a whole."15 The concern about disqualifica-
tion would seem to apply only in the context of hostile takeovers; a bank
asked to evaluate the fairness of a merger or a freeze-out price would
have little hope of being hired by a newly emerging bidder. Further-
more, market forces can respond to concerns about disqualification; if
these concerns really matter, some specialized investment banks that do
nothing but write fairness opinions (and thus do not have to worry about
disqualification) will emerge. Lastly, investment banks can insure
against legal liability and, in any case, the threat of legal liability will
have positive effects as investment banks exercise more care and neutral-
ity in rendering fairness opinions.' 6
D. Residual Skepticism
Even if courts follow the above approach, we feel that they should
still use substantial caution in relying on fairness opinions. While our
approach addresses some of the problems inherent in fairness opinions,
significant residual problems remain. First, although our approach does
much to reduce the discretion rooted in the definition of fairness, invest-
ment banks would retain significant discretion in measuring fair price.
Estimating the value of uncertain future income streams, assets that are
not openly traded in the market, or prices that companies would com-
mand in an auction that is never held is an inherently subjective and
imprecise activity. Specifying price ranges and performing sensitivity
analyses would reduce these subjective elements, but even these remedies
would not magically transform fairness opinions into objective yardsticks
of a company's value.
Second, our approach does not completely eliminate all incentives
for banks to write pro-management fairness opinions. The scrutiny we
propose would reduce the conflicts of interest inherent in the fee struc-
ture, but would not reduce the incentives created by the desire to retain
and attract clients. Even uninvolved "outside" banks would still have
114. See Note, supra note 12, at 135-39 (discussing investment banker's potential liability).
115. See e, Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A-2d 701, 704-06 (Del. 1983) (bank given S150,000
for fairness opinion in cash tender offer of over S90,000,000, which involved a premium over market
price of more than $30,000,000).
116. Cf Note, supra note 12, at 135 (advocating increased liability of investment banks).
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incentives to deliver opinions that retain and attract clients. t1 7
Third, even if these reputational incentives to render pro-manage-
ment opinions were absent, the simple fact that managers select invest-
ment banks leads to biased opinions. Investment banking firms are likely
to differ in how they measure fair prices and in whether their estimates
tend to come out high or low. For example, it might become known that
a particular bank tends to rely on adjusted share prices to determine fair
prices. Managers could select that bank if such a method of determining
price were likely to result in the desired fairness opinion.
Fourth, courts would have to remain aware that fairness opinions
are, in part, necessarily based on information provided by managers
themselves, such as managerial opinions about future business pros-
pects '" 8 or internal profit forecasts.'1 9 Managers have an obvious incen-
tive to provide banks with the kind of information that tends to
encourage pro-management opinions.' 2° Investment banks generally do
not verify the information they receive in preparing their opinions;' 2'
rather, they premise their opinions on the assumption that the informa-
tion given to them is accurate and complete.' 2 For this reason as well,
fairness opinions will tend to remain pro-management in character.
In light of these residual problems, the question arises whether
courts should simply ignore fairness opinions. We think not: for all their
problems, fairness opinions have a positive potential. Although invest-
ment banks retain some discretion, many prices will clearly fall inside or
outside specified reasonable price ranges and banks will thus have to find
those prices fair or unfair, Even though investment banks will have in-
centives to develop pro-management reputations, if they are too blatant
about it, they will risk losing credibility with the courts. Therefore, as
117. Such incentives would be especially strong for investment banks that specialize in writing
fairness opinions. Those banks would derive a significant part of their revenues from these opinions.
A reputation for not agreeing with managers would go to the heart of their business.
118. See ag., Crouse-Hinds Co. & Belden Corp., supra note 9, exhs. C, D (both investment
banks, in preparing their fairness opinions, held discussions with management about future business
prospects).
119. See, e.g., Alleghany Corp. & Investors Diversified Servs. Inc., supra note 9, annex III (Mer-
rill Lynch using internal forecasts in developing its fairness opinion).
120. One commentator has proposed that directors should be under a duty to convey accurate
information to investment banks. See Note, supra note 12, at 132-33. Such a rule might prevent
outright lies, but not more subtle forms of bias.
121. See, ,,g., Crouse-Hinds Co. & Belden Corp., supra note 9, exhs. C, D: Alleghany Corp. &
Investors Diversified Servs. Inc., supra note 9, annexes III, IV (no independent verification of infor-
mation provided by the company); see also Denison Mines Ltd. v. Fibreboard Corp., 388 F. Supp.
812, 822 (D. Del. 1974) (investment bank relied on management valuation of timber assets and
conducted no independent evaluation).
122. See, eg., Crouse-Hinds Co. & Belden Corp., supra note 9. exhs. C, D: Alleghany Corp. &
Investors Diversified Servs. Inc.. supra note 9. annexes III, IV.
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long as excessive judicial reliance on fairness opinions is avoided, such
opinions do have the potential for serving a useful function.
IV. CONCLUSION
The purpose of this Article has been to analyze the problems with
fairness opinions and to suggest a judicial approach for evaluating such
opinions. Fairness opinions are problematic because investment banks
have substantial discretion in rendering such opinions. The banks' dis-
cretion derives from two sources: first, the concept of fair value is not
clearly defined, and banks can thus choose among several proposed defi-
nitions of fairness; second, the subjective nature of the estimation process
creates discretion in measuring fair price, however it is defined.
Investment banks face conflicts of interest that lead them to use
their discretion to render pro-management fairness opinions. For one,
pro-management opinions generally increase banks' revenue. Such opin-
ions make banks more likely to receive contingent fees or, where a bank
does not receive a contingent fee, generate further work. Furthermore,
rendering pro-management opinions will help banks to retain and attract
clients. These incentives are enhanced by psychological and social loy-
alty that some bankers may feel towards managers. Neither the desire to
preserve a professional reputation nor the presence of internal procedures
will significantly reduce these problems.
To deal with these problems, we rec'ommend an approach that helps
courts to scrutinize definitions of fair price, the measurement of fair
price, and the company-banker relationship. First, courts should develop
a definition of fair price that they consider proper. Investment banks, in
turn, should disclose their definitions of fair price. Second, to reduce
discretion in the measurement of fair price, the weight given to a fairness
opinion should depend on whether the opinion contains information on
the range of fair prices and on the sensitivity of the price estimate. Third,
courts should discount fairness opinions when the writing bank is com-
pensated by a contingent fee, when it is involved in other aspects of the
transaction, and when it has had prior dealings with the company at is-
sue. This discounting will reduce incentives for rendering pro-manage-
ment opinions. In any case, since the recommended approach would
reduce, but not eliminate, discretion and pro-management incentives,
courts should exercise substantial caution in assessing and giving weight
to fairness opinions.
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